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Criminal Law - Aviation - Bomb Hoax
Following the disaster in 1956 near Longmont, Colorado, in which
forty-five lives were lost as a result of a bomb explosion in the baggage
compartment of an airliner, Congress enacted the "bomb hoax" or "false
tip" statute, 18 U.S.C. § 35.' The statute established a federal crime
for willfully imparting or conveying information, known to be false, con-
cerning attempts or alleged attempts to do any act prohibited by 18
U.S.C. § 322 Section 32 was enacted simultaneously with Section 35
and its purpose was to provide adequate punishment in the federal courts
for the willful damaging or destruction of aircraft used in interstate,
overseas, or foreign air commerce, and for attempts to damage or destroy
such aircraft.a In prosecuting under Section 35, federal prosecutors inter-
preted the word "willfully" as meaning merely a voluntary and conscious
imparting or conveying of the false report, but it was difficult to convince
118 U.S.C. § 35 (1956)
§ 35. Imparting or conveying false information
Whoever willfully imparts or conveys or causes to be imparted or conveyed false
information, knowing the information to be false, concerning an attempt or alleged
attempt being made or to be made to do any act which would be a crime prohibited
by this chapter or chapter 97 or chapter 111 of this title--shall be fined not more
than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year or both.
2 18 U.S.C. § 32 (1956)
32. Destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities
Whoever willfully sets fire to, damages, destroys, disables, or wrecks any civil
aircraft used, operated, or employed in interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce;
or
Whoever willfully sets fire to, damages, destroys, disables, or wrecks any aircraft
engine, propeller, appliance, or spare part with intent to damage, destroy, disable,
or wreck any such aircraft; or
Whoever, with like intent, willfully places or causes to be placed any destructive
substance in, upon, or in proximity to any such aircraft, or any aircraft engine,
propeller, appliance, spare part, fuel, lubricant, hydraulic fluid, or other material
used or intended to be used in connection with the operation of any such aircraft,
or any cargo carried or intended to be carried on any such aircraft, aircraft engine,
propeller, appliance, spare part, fuel, lubricant, hydraulic fluid, or other material
unworkable or unusable, or hazardous to work or use; or
Whoever, with like intent, willfully sets fire to, damages, destroys, disables, or
wrecks, or places or causes to be placed any destructive substance in, upon, or in
proximity to any shop, supply, structure, station, depot, terminal, hangar, ramp,
landing area, air-navigation facility or other facility, warehouse, property, machine,
or apparatus used or intended to be used in connection with the operation, loading,
or unloading of any such aircraft or making any aircraft ready for flight, or other-
wise makes or causes to be made any such shop, supply, structure, station, depot,
terminal, hangar, ramp, landing area, air-navigation facility, or other facility, ware-
house, property, machine, or apparatus unworkable or unusable or hazardous to work
or use; or
Whoever, with like intent, willfully incapacitates any member of the crew of any
such aircraft; or
Whoever willfully attempts to do any of the aforesaid acts or things-shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years or both.
Added July 14, 1956, c. 595, § 1, 70 Stat. 539.
aSee H.R. No. 1979, 84th Cong. 2d Sess., U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News (Mar. 29, 1956)
p. 3145,
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the courts that the word did not embrace an evil purpose." Because of the
difficulty in interpreting the meaning of "willfully," Section 35 was
amended in 1961."
The 1961 amendment was designed to make the existing law on im-
parting false bomb information more effective by making it a misdemeanor
knowingly, but without malice, to impart or convey such information,
and a felony to convey such false information willfully and maliciously
or with a reckless disregard for human life.' Attorney General Kennedy,
in a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, stated that the
amendment was submitted by the Justice Department in order to clarify
the statute and deter false bomb reports by pranksters which disrupt the
orderly operations of aircraft and other common carriers.7 Section 35, as
amended, covers false reports made with a specific intent to harm the
carrier by disrupting air traffic as well as those made in jest.
Four of the six reported cases under Section 35 were concerned with
violations of the statute prior to the amendment in 1961. There is disagree-
ment between the various courts as to what the indictment, information,
or complaint must allege in order to be sufficient.
In Smith v. United States,' the first reported case prosecuted under Sec-
tion 3 5, the defendant was convicted of telephoning to the federal agency
in charge of an airport control tower a false report that a bomb was on
an outgoing aircraft. Although the sufficiency of the indictment in the
Smith case was not in issue, it charged the defendant, in the language of
Section 3 5, with conveying a false report that an attempt was being made
to place a bomb upon an aircraft with intent to damage, destroy, disable,
and wreck such aircraft.9
The defendant in United States v. Silver0 stated to the ticket agent
when making arrangements for his flight, "I have a bomb in my brief
' The Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House of Representatives amended
the proposed Section 35 to cover fictitious, as well as false, reports that attempts to destroy or
damage an aircraft were being made or contemplated.
s18 U.S.C. § 35 (1956), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 35 (Supp. V 1961).
5 35. Imparting or conveying false information
(a) Whoever imparts or conveys or causes to be imparted or conveyed false in-
formation, knowing the information to be false, concerning an attempt or alleged
attempt being made or to be made, to do any act which would be a crime prohibited
by this chapter or chapter 97 or chapter 111 of this title shall be fined not more
than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
(b) Whoever willfully and maliciously or with reckless disregard for the safety
of human life, imparts or conveys, or causes to be imparted or conveyed false in-
formation, knowing the information to be false, concerning an attempt or an alleged
attempt being made or to be made, to do any act which would be a crime prohibited
by this chapter or chapter 97 or chapter 111 of this title--shall be fined not more
than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years or both.
OSee S.R. No. 1055, 87th Cong. 1st Sess., U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News (Sept. 15, 1961)
p. 3052.7 Id. at 3054.
8283 F.2d 16 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 847 (1961).
'The indictment in the Smith case note 8 supra reads as follows:
. . . Robert James Smith did willfully impart and convey and cause to be imparted
and conveyed, false information, knowing the same to be false, concerning an attempt
and alleged attempt being made and to be made to willfully place and cause to be
placed a destructive substance, to wit: a bomb, and employed in interstate commerce
with intent to damage, destroy, disable, and wreck such aircraft, a crime prohibited
by Section 32, Title 18, United States Code, a part of Chapter II, Title 18, United
States Code . . .
'0 196 F. Supp. 677 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
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case," and the plane was delayed some twenty minutes. After a search, it
was revealed that Silver was carrying a can of aerosol bug spray with the
words "Bug Bomb" on its label. The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled that Section 3 5 did not require that
the defendant have an actual and true intent to do damage to an aircraft
as well as the giving of false information. The court stated that to be in
violation of Section 35 proof of intent to violate Section 32 was un-
necessary.
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Carlson v. United States," held that the information which charged Carl-
son with violating Section 35 was fatally defective in that it alleged that
he had falsely informed the stewardess that explosives had been placed
on an aircraft, but failed to allege that he had falsely informed her that
the explosives were placed on the aircraft with intent to damage or destroy
it. The court also held that while the information must allege that the
false report was to the effect that explosives were placed on the aircraft
with intent to damage or destroy it, the prosecution need not prove the
defendant expressly stated that such was the purpose in placing explosives
on the aircraft. It would be sufficient if the recipient could have reasonably
inferred that the informant intended to convey the idea that the aircraft
would be damaged or destroyed. The facts and indictment in the Smith
case would have met this court's requirements for a conviction."
In United States v. Allen," the defendant, relying on the Carlson case,
contended that the information was defective for failure to allege that
the false report contained an allegation of intent on someone's part to
damage or destroy the plane. In finding the information sufficient, the
court held that an actual intent to damage on someone's part need not
be alleged in the information. The holding which upheld the information
was in direct conflict with the holding in the Carlson case. The question,
"Is that the bag with the bomb in it?" made in front of an airport
attendant, was held to be sufficient to convict Allen under Section 35.
The court stated that Allen's statement was open to the inference that
he meant the destruction of the plane was contemplated.
In United States v. Sullivan,4 the first of two reported cases under the
amended Section 35, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, re-
lying on the decision in the Allen case, ruled that the information need
not allege specifically a threat to destroy the plane. In the Sullivan case
the defendant used the words "bomb" or "TNT" while asking the
stewardess about his bags while airborne on a Mohawk Airlines flight. The
court also held that an allegation of malice or of an evil purpose is not
required in the information, indictment, or complaint.
In the most recent case under Section 35, United States v. Rutherford,"
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, again relying on the Allen
case, upheld an indictment which was similar to the information in the
Sullivan case. The indictment did not contain an allegation that the hoax
" 296 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1961).
12 See note 9 supra.
's317 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1963).
'4329 F.2d 755 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1005 (1964).
5 332 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1964).
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involved a statement that a bomb was placed on the aircraft with intent
to damage or destroy it. The court further ruled that the statute was not
unconstitutionally vague and that it did not offend the First Amendment
as applied to the defendant's act.
To be guilty of the offense described in Section 35, as amended, a de-
fendant must impart or convey or cause to be imparted or conveyed in-
formation concerning an attempt or an alleged attempt being made or
to be made to do an act which would be a crime prohibited by Section 32,
such information being false and known to be false. Under Section 32, it
is a crime to place a destructive substance upon or in proximity to an air-
craft only if one has an intent to damage or destroy such aircraft. The
courts in the Silver, Allen, and Sullivan cases correctly held that the de-
fendant need not have an actual intent to damage or destroy an aircraft
in order to be convicted under Section 35. If a defendant's statement is
false to begin with, it is impossible for him to have an actual intent to
damage or destroy an aircraft. At most his intent would be to disrupt the
orderly operations of air carriers. However, since an intent to do damage
is an essential element of Section 32,6 the court in the Carlson case properly
ruled that the indictment, information, or complaint must allege that the
false report was to the effect that a destructive substance was placed in,
upon, or in proximity to an aircraft with the intent to destroy or damage
such aircraft. The phrase "with the intent to destroy or damage" should
be construed as meaning "for the purpose of destroying or damaging."
The court in the Carlson case strictly construed Section 35, but such a
construction does not prevent Section 35 from covering false reports made
in jest as well as those made with a specific intent to harm the carrier by
disrupting traffic, since a false statement mentioning explosives violates
the statute if it is open to a reasonable inference that the destruction of
an aircraft is being attempted or contemplated. The courts should not be
concerned with the defendant's purpose in making the false report. How-
ever, a person should not be convicted for merely mentioning explosives
unless his statements are open to a reasonable inference that the destruc-
tion of an aircraft is being contemplated." Unless his statements can rea-
sonably be interpreted as meaning that explosives have been placed upon
or near an aircraft with intent to damage or destroy or for the purpose
of damaging or destroying it, he has committed no crime under Section 35.
Rodney D. Moore
, Carlson v. United States, note 10 supra.
"7In United States v. Rex Lyon Simpson, Crim. No. 3-246, D. Dallas Div., April 8, 1964,
the defendant had made a statement to an airport official to the effect that he had an atomic
bomb in his brief case and the information charged him with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 35a.
The case was dismissed with the approval of the Justice Department after defendant's attorney
argued that since everyone knew that the government had a monopoly on atomic bombs it was
not reasonable for the airport official to infer that an attempt to destroy an aircraft was being
made or contemplated.
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Warsaw Convention - Wilful Misconduct
Damage Limitation
In a wrongful death action the plaintiff, to avoid the damage limitation
provision of the Warsaw Convention,1 alleged that the defendant airline
was guilty of wilful misconduct. The international flight was without
incident and the aircraft was normal in all respects until it reached the
United States coast line where the crash occurred. However, the pilot had
disregarded radio orders to maintain an altitude of at least 500 feet above
all clouds until signaled by radio to descend. There was no appearance
that the radio signal device was not functioning or that a false signal was
received by the pilot. Held: Plaintiff's motion for judgment non obstante
veredicto was granted. Even though it was not shown that the pilot in-
tended the fatal crash or had actual realization of the danger of a crash,
his action in flying below the ordered level constituted wilful misconduct
under the Warsaw Convention. Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific
Airlines, Ltd., 219 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
The elements of wilful misconduct given in the Berner court's jury
instructions' are consistent with the Restatement of Torts' and with jury
instructions in other cases involving wilful misconduct." Neither the vio-
lation of regulations or orders alone,' nor negligence in failing to dis-
charge some duty necessary to safety, would be sufficient without knowl-
edge that damage is substantially certain to follow.' Yet reckless disregard
for the consequences may be used as a substitute for such knowledge
where the actor's duty is so obvious that a breach thereof constitutes more
than mere negligence." Further, proof of a malicious or felonious intent
is not necessary.
However, the federal courts have applied the wilful misconduct pro-
vision in only two cases prior to Berner to allow recovery in excess of the
Warsaw Convention limits. In American Airlines, Inc. v. Ulen' wilful mis-
conduct was found for chartering a flight less than 1,000 feet above the
highest obstacle (a mountain) in the course to be flown. In Koninklijke
Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines Holland v.
Tuller,"' four instances of wilful misconduct were pointed out: (1) failure
to instruct passengers as to location and use of life vests; (2) failure
' Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by
Air, Oct. 12, 1929, art. 22. Recovery is limited to $8,292.00. Art. 25 makes the limitation in-
applicable when the accident results from "Wilful misconduct." 49 Stat. 3020 (1934).
219 F. Supp. 289, 360. "1. The intentional performance of an act or failure to perform an
act. 2. Knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man or woman
to realize. 3. That his conduct not only created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the pas-
sengers. 4. But also involved a high degree of probability that substantial harm would result to
the aircraft and the passengers by the doing or failing to do the act in question."
3 Sec. 500, Reckless Disregard of Safety.
" Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V. KLM Royal Dutch Air Lines Holland v. Tuller,
292 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Grey v. American Airlines, Inc., 227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1955);
Pekelis v. Transcontinental and Western Air, Inc., 187 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 951 (1951); American Airlines, Inc. v. Ulen, 186 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
'American Airlines, Inc. v. Ulen, supra note 4.
' Pekelis v. Transcontinental and Western Air, Inc., supra note 4.
' Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines Holland v. Tuller,
supra note 4.
' American Airlines, Inc. v. Ulen, supra note 4.
9 Ibid.
1o Supra note 4.
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to send a distress signal; (3) failure to take appropriate steps to rescue
the deceased from the tail of the plane after the crash; and (4) failure of
the ground agent to be aware of loss of radio contact with the airplane and
to institute a prompt search and rescue operation. Berner, as the third
American case in which wilful misconduct under the Warsaw Convention
has been found, may be indicative of similar future holdings, especially
in view of the growing discontent with damage limitations in actions
arising out of airplane crashes.' Such a discontent was most aptly dis-
played when this case finally went to trial on the issue of damages. A
jury verdict resulted in the amount of 924,396 dollars."1
John E. McFall
Hague Protocol - Ratification
The United States has failed to take action to ratify the Hague Protocol
of 1955' which became effective in ratifying nations August 1, 1963.
This international agreement amended the Warsaw Convention of 1929,
ratified by the United States in 1934.' This country with forty-five other
nations has adopted the Warsaw Convention which provides a damage
limitation of 8,292 dollars for personal injuries and death to passengers on
international flights.' However, the treaty provides in Article 25 that
the carrier shall not be permitted to avail itself of the limitation on dam-
ages if the accident was caused by "wilful misconduct."' The new treaty,
the Hague Protocol, provides that the damage limitation be doubled to
16,584 dollars and re-defines the wilful misconduct provision of the earlier
treaty.
There has been much debate in this country over ratification of the
protocol. As expected the aviation industry and insurance groups have
taken a stand in favor of the treaty. A committee of the New York Bar
Association also spoke out for the protocol setting forth the principal
" 30 J. Air L. & Com. 395 (1964); 30 J. Air L. & Com. 98 (1964); Gardner, So You're Going
to Fly to London, 43 A.B.A.J. 412 (1957); Lissitzyn, International Aviation Policy: The Warsaw
Convention, The Hague Protocol and International Limitation of Liability, 56 Am. Soc. Int. L.
Proc. 115 (1962).
"Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 230 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
' ICAO Doc. 7632. See generally, Committee on Aeronautics, Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, Report on the Warsaw Convention as Amended by the Hague Protocol, 26
J. Air L. & Com. 255 (1959) (Hereinafter Report); Mennell & Simeone, United States Policy
and the Warsaw Convention, 2 Washburn L.J. 219 (1963).
'49 Stat. 3000 (1934); see generally, Drion, Limitation of Liabilities in International Air
Law (1954).
aArt. 22, supra note 2 at 3003.
' There has been much discussion and resulting confusion over Article 25 in the official French
version which uses the word "dol" (implies fraud or deceit) rather than "wilful misconduct"
which has been supplied in the translation.
' Under Article 25 of the Hague Protocol the damage limitation will not apply if it is proved
that the damage resulted from an act or omission of the carrier, its servant or agent, done with
intent to cause damage or recklessly with knowledge that damage would probably result. See
generally, Report, supra note 1 at 260; United States Policy and the Warsaw Convention, supra
note 1 at 240.
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reasons for ratification that other groups have advanced.! They were first
concerned with the protection of American citizens and secondly con-
cerned with the United States' responsibility to foster and encourage
international agreements. Those against ratification have argued that the
principle of limiting liability is foreign to our traditional concept of com-
mon law justice.7 There has been some concern that the increased liability
for passengers would be an invitation to sabotage, especially in Asian
countries.
Recent developments in the Senate, by courts and in governmental
agencies have brought the question of ratification into public view. Per-
haps the strongest statement to date concerning the treaty was by Senator
Norris Cotton (R-N.H.), the ranking minority member of the Senate
Aviation Subcommittee. In a speech before the Senate on November 14,
1963, the Senator said:
The United States Government through wilful inaction is in the position of
placing a lower value on the lives of its citizens than almost any other major
nation. Whether it is from vacillating indecision or callous indifference on
the part of the Administration, the result is that, in the usual situation the
life of an American today is worth only half as much as the life of a French-
man, an Italian ... or a Russian.'
While the Senator urged ratification of the treaty he made it clear that
other courses of action would also protect United States citizens.1 Another
recent development was a Civil Aeronautics Board regulation requiring
airlines to inform passengers of the existence and amount of airline liability
under the Warsaw Convention." Still another important development
was the decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
Tuller v. KLM" in which the court manifested a liberal tendency to allow
recovery over the limits of the Warsaw Convention by making use of
the "wilful misconduct" provision. The four acts of misconducta in
Tuller seem to be below the degree of fault found necessary in earlier
6 Report, supra note 1, at 266. "Recommendation . . . for the United States therefore, to
renounce international agreement in an important area affecting international air carriage-and
particularly where the United States has been largely responsible for the latest version of such
agreement-would deal a serious blow to United States prestige in this field and would hamper
the continuing efforts of the United States to obtain wider international agreement on matters
affecting international air transport ... "
'See, e.g., New York Times, June 23, 1963, p. 87, col. 1.
s Ibid.
* 184 Cong. Rec. 20752 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 1963) [hereinafter Speech].
1o Ibid. Cotton did not elaborate, however, on any other plans, but suggested that they be
explored without delay.
" CAB Order No. E-395. Aviation Daily, Nov. 5, 1963. p. 2. Carriers are required to
publish information in their tariffs, print on tickets or ticket envelopes or enclose with the ticket
on a separate slip of paper, and post on signs at the ticket counter a statement advising the dollar
amount of the carrier's limit of liability. This regulation, which became effective March 1, 1964,
was praised by Senator Cotton for "throwing the whole situation into the light of public aware-
ness." Speech, supra note 9.
"2292 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied 368 U.S. 921 (1961), noted 37 N.Y.L.J. 323
(1962).
13 The four acts upon which the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of 35,000 dollars
were: (1) that KLM failed to properly instruct passengers about life vests; (2) that defendant
failed to broadcast an emergency message; (3) that defendant's crew failed to take steps to
rescue the deceased from the tail of the plane when various alternatives of rescue were available;
and (4) that KLM's ground agent failed to take notice to initiate prompt search and rescue
operations when it did learn that the plane was missing.
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cases.'4 Tuller suggests dissatisfaction with present limits on carrier liability,
and may be indicative of future awards based on a judicially expanded
concept of wilful misconduct." In yet another development pointing to-
ward ratification, the Interagency Group on International Aviation
(IGIA), headed by FAA Administrator Najeeb Halaby, sent its recom-
mendation for ratification (accompanied by draft legislation) to the
State Department on August 12, 1963.1" However, the Administration
has not taken steps to bring the matter before Congress. The IGIA also
recommended simultaneous enactment of legislation requiring United
States airlines to carry 50,000 dollar trip insurance on each international
passenger, 7 but this proposal has also generated little administrative action.
These recent developments clearly show an effort to force the Adminis-
tration to make a decision on ratification of the protocol. The net effect
of these efforts remains to be seen, but they have been successful to some
extent, as Senator Cotton puts it, "in throwing the whole situation into
the light of public awareness."'" Further, the Tuller case indicates that
passengers (or their representatives) will be allowed to recover more than
the convention limits under facts heretofore found to establish less than
wilful misconduct." Certainly if the question of ratification should come
to a vote, it is evident that pressure and opinion is for the treaty, and the
arguments advanced for ratification remain intact. The protection of
American citizens on international flights demands adoption of the treaty.
The 8,292 dollar limit on liability under the convention is unreasonable
considering today's increased standard of living and values. Further, re-
fusal to ratify the Hague Protocol is inconsistent with the role of the
United States as a leader in international cooperation, especially in this
instance because of the part played by the United States in drafting the
protocol.
George Bramblett
" Prior to Tuller the only other American decision to give a plaintiff recovery in excess of
the Convention limits was American Airlines v. Ulen, 186 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1949). The
"wilful misconduct" in that case was the defendant's failure to chart the height of a mountain
in its flight plan. As a result of this oversight the plane crashed into that mountain while flying
on course at the scheduled altitude.
"See Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, 219 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1963),
noted in 30 J. Air L. & Com. 394 (1964).
"6 Aviation Daily, Nov. 18, 1963, p. 89.
17 Ibid.
I Speech, supra note 8.
'OSee supra note 15 and accompanying text.
20 See supra note 6.
